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DRAFT

Escape from the Twilight Zone: Minnesota’s Definitions of “Substantial Bodily Harm” and
“Great Bodily Harm” Leave Too Much Room for Injustice, and They Can Be Improved.
Joshua Larson1
What a frightening thing is the human, a mass of gauges and dials
and registers, and we can only read a few and those perhaps not
accurately.2
Part 1: Introduction
Charging someone with a felony-level assault is not akin to sticking a toe in the water; it is a dive
from a significant height. A prosecutor’s irrevocable decision to commence such a serious case
against an individual will be the paramount, most consequential choice in its litigation. With that
said, all but the most strident adversary would stipulate that, while considering whether to
proceed with a criminal complaint, prosecutors are simultaneously “ministers of justice,”3
lawyers, and human beings. In occupying these roles, prosecutors are guided and constrained by
their best reading of the Criminal Code4 and their principles of ethics5 and subject to the creeping
dynamics of culture. It should be no surprise then that, as a prosecutor sits down with a set of
police reports to consider whether to charge a person with a violent crime, three questions
inevitably spring to mind: “Did it happen? Can I prove it? How will others evaluate my
decision?” These questions compel prosecutors to decide: to choose whether to produce a
criminal complaint that, in addition to being the documentation of a crime, is a sort of script for a
legal Gesamtkuntswerk, the generation of which is part mathematics, part divination, and part
cultural expression. This article focuses on a problem that occasionally arises when considering
the “mathematics” of charging felony-level assault cases in Minnesota.
Generating a complaint is “mathematical” in the straightforward sense that a prosecutor must
identify alleged conduct that adds up to meet the elements of the charged offense(s).6 It is
“divination” in the sense that a prosecutor must judge that certain witnesses are telling the truth,
that they would testify consistently at trial, and that a group of fair-minded jurors would believe

1

Joshua Larson is a prosecutor in the Adult Prosecution Division of the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office in
Minneapolis, Minnesota and a contributing author to the Minnesota Judges Criminal Benchbook and the Minnesota
Courtroom Evidence Deskbook. The author wishes to thank Allison Ethan, Meggen Lindsey, Frances Kern, and the
William Mitchell Law Review staff for their assistance.
2
John Steinbeck, The Winter of Our Discontent (1961).
3
State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 798 (Minn. 2000).
4
See Minn. Stat. § 609.01 (2012) (“[Minn. Stat. ch. 609] shall be construed according to the fair import of its terms,
to promote justice, and to effect its purposes which are declared to be . . . to protect the individual against the misuse
of the criminal law by fairly defining the acts and omissions prohibited . . . .”).
5
See generally, e.g., Minn. R. Pro. Conduct (2012).
6
See Minn. R. Crim. P. 2.01 (The complaint is a written signed statement of the facts establishing probable cause to
believe that the charged offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it . . . .”).

1

DRAFT

them.7 And it is inevitably “cultural expression,” as charging decisions do not occur in a void,
but rather inside several Matryoshka-doll-like communities that impart norms and shepherd
natural human emotions, from a desire to enact justice and enforce the rights of the public to a
prosecutor’s fear of embarrassment, disrepute, and failure.
Usually, the mathematics of charging a case is the easiest aspect to consider because most of the
elements of most crimes are objective and unambiguous. It is the part of the mental process that
requires little emotion, like measuring the dimensions of a room. Indeed, that was a significant
goal in the “element analysis” approach of the Model Penal Code (“MPC” hereafter),8 which
Minnesota largely adopted in 1963.9 In a typical case, once a read-through of a set of police
reports illuminates who did what when where and to whom, a prosecutor can consider whether
the alleged conduct- abstracted from all other case dynamics- at least fits the elements of some
potential charge and then move on to further, more “practical” considerations, where other
aspects of a prosecutor’s experience, passion, and idiosyncratic standards may play a role in the
ultimate charging decision.
In Minnesota, however, the mathematical aspect of charging felony-level assault cases is
complicated by a lack of clarity in how we define the crimes, specifically the definitions of two
pertinent terms: “Substantial Bodily Harm” and “Great Bodily Harm,” which are the
distinguishing elements to the felony offenses of Assault in the Third Degree and Assault in the
First Degree respectively. Because these terms lack clarity, the ships can become unmoored, and
prosecutors tend to develop disparate, subjective “working definitions” of the terms, which can
produce different charging thresholds, unequal treatment of similarly-situated suspects, and
hence injustice.
It does not have to be this way. To reduce the potential for this type of injustice, the Minnesota
legislature should refine the definitions of “Substantial Bodily Harm” and “Great Bodily
Harm.”10 By refining these definitions, the legislature could make prosecutors’ charging
decisions in assault cases much more objective and consequently easier, fairer, and more just.
This article proposes that the Minnesota legislature adopt the definition of “Substantial Bodily
Harm” found in the Wisconsin Criminal Code and amend the definition of “Great Bodily Harm”
to increase specificity to what types of injuries are covered by the term.
The article first will discuss the current assault-statute regime in Minnesota and its origin and
development. Then, the article will identify appellate decisions that have examined the concepts
7

Minn. R. Pro. Cond. 3.8(a) (2012) (“The prosecutor in criminal case shall refrain from prosecuting a charge that
the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause.”).
http://lprb.mncourts.gov/rules/Documents/MN%20Rules%20of%20Professional%20Conduct.pdf
8
An Introduction to the Model Penal Code, Paul H. Robinson and Markus Dirk Dubber,
https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf, pg. 12, last accessed Dec. 13, 2012 (citing Paul H.
Robinson & Jane A. Grall, “Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability,” 35 Stanford Law Review 681 (1983).
9
Id. at 8. See also Section II.
10
See Minn. Stat. § 609.224 (2012). (defining Assault in the Fifth Degree); Minn. Stat. § 609.223 (2012). (defining
Assault in the Third Degree; and Minn. Stat. § 609.221 (2012). (defining Assault in the First Degree).
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of bodily harm, substantial bodily harm, and great bodily harm. Following this, the article will
describe the Wisconsin assault-statute regime. Lastly, the article will propose how Minnesota
should improve.
Part 2, Degrees of Assault, generally defined.
In Minnesota, a person commits an assault if he “intentional[ly] inflict[s] . . . bodily harm upon
another.”11 There are five degrees of assault.12 The degrees of assault at issue in this article are
Assault in Fifth Degree, Assault in the Third Degree, and Assault in the First Degree; these are
the degrees of assault that differ only in regard to the seriousness of the harm suffered by the
victim.13 The other two degrees of assault are not distinguishable by the seriousness of harm
suffered by the victim.14
A quick glance at Assault in the Fifth, Third, and First Degrees illuminates that the differences
between the three, most significantly the potential punishment upon conviction, are vast.
Assault in the Fifth Degree requires only that the victim suffer some “bodily harm,” 15 broadly
defined as “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.”16 In
almost all circumstances, Assault in the Fifth Degree is a misdemeanor offense, 17 punishable by
up to 90 days in jail.18
Assault in the Third Degree requires that the victim suffer “substantial bodily harm,”19 defined as
“bodily injury which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a
temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or
which causes a fracture of any bodily member.”20 The most significant feature of Assault in
Third Degree, distinguishing it from Assault in the Fifth Degree, is that it is a felony offense,
punishable up to five years in prison21 and carrying all of the immediate and collateral

11

Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10 (2012).
See Minn. Stat. 609.21-224 (2012).
13
See Minn. Stat. § 609.224 (2012). (defining Assault in the Fifth Degree); Minn. Stat. § 609.223 (2012). (defining
Assault in the Third Degree; and Minn. Stat. § 609.221 (2012). (defining Assault in the First Degree).
14
See Minn. Stat. § 609.2231 (2012). (defining types of Assault in the Fourth Degree primarily by the identity of the
victim, e.g. police officers and ambulance drivers) and Minn. Stat. § 609.222 (2012) (defining Assault in the
Second Degree as an assault with a dangerous weapon).
15
Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1 (2012).
16
Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7 (2012).
17
Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1 (2012). If a defendant has one or more convictions or adjudications for “qualified
domestic violence-related offense[s],” a prosecutor may be able to charge Assault in the Fifth Degree as a gross
misdemeanor or felony, but neither enhancement would be based on the seriousness of the harm suffered by the
victim. See Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 2, 4 (2012).
18
Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 3 (2012). Please note that, throughout this article, the discussions “punishment” and
“sentencing” refer only to periods of executed or stayed incarceration, not the imposition of fines.
19
Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1 (2012).
20
Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7a (2012).
21
Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1 (2012).
12
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consequences that a felony conviction entails.22 If a defendant has no criminal history, the
presumptive sentence in the case is a year and a day, execution of which is stayed,23 and, upon
conviction, a defendant typically receives a probationary sentence.24 If a defendant has a
criminal-history score of four, however, the presumptive sentence is an executed sentence of 24
months. 25
Assault in the First Degree requires that the victim suffered “great bodily harm,”26 defined as
“bodily injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent
disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily harm.”27 Assault in the First Degree is a
felony offense, punishable up to twenty years in prison.28 If a defendant has no criminal history,
the presumptive sentence in the case is an executed sentence of 86 months.29 If a defendant has a
criminal-history score of four, the presumptive sentence is an executed sentence of 134 months.30
Part 3, Development of Assault Statutes under the Criminal Code in Minnesota
3A. Model Penal Code
This article will delve into a discussion of the current Assault-offense regime in Part 4, but it is
helpful to develop a historical perspective on its origins. After years of development, the
American Law Institute promulgated the MPC in 1962. In the MPC, there was only a
misdemeanor-level-assault offense titled “Simple Assault” and two felony-level-assault offenses
titled “Aggravated Assault.”31 The misdemeanor offense was premised on the defendant causing
mere “bodily injury to another.”32 The two felony offenses were premised on causing “serious
bodily injury to another” and use of a “deadly weapon” respectively.33

22

See, e.g., Sames v. State, 805 N.W.2d 565, 567-70 (Minn. App. 2011) (discussing distinction between direct
consequences and collateral consequences when determining whether a guilty plea is valid or invalid); Minn. Const.
Art. 7, § 1 (“The following persons shall not be entitled or permitted to vote at any election in this case: . . . a person
who has been convicted of treason or felony, unless restored of civil rights . . . . “).
23
Minn. Sent. Guidelines § 2 (defining Assault in the Third Degree as a level IV felony).
24
Minn. Sent. Guidelines § 2; Minn. Stat. 609.135.
25
Minn. Sent. Guidelines § 2.
26
Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2012).
27
Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd.8 (2012).
28
Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2012).
29
Minn. Sent. Guidelines § 2 (defining Assault in the First Degree as a level IX felony). More specific footnote
needed.
30
Minn. Sent. Guidelines § 2.
31
MPC § 211.1 (1)-(2).
32
MPC § 211.1 (1). It should be noted that the MPC also allows for a Simple Assault to be sentenced as a “petty
misdemeanor” if the assault was committed “in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent.” Id.
33
MPC § 211.1 (2). Interestingly, the MPC authors directly rejected enacting a statute analogous to Minnesota’s
Assault in the Fourth Degree, nothing “the Model Code departs from prior statutory law in dispensing with grading
based on the status of the victim, for example, as a public official. MPC §211.1, comment 1(c), pg. 185. The authors
held that “[s]pecial provision is unnecessary in view of the ample severity of penalties against murder and all serious
attacks upon the person, regardless of the identity of the victim.” Id.
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One acquainted with Minnesota law would find the MPC’s definitions of “bodily injury” and
“serious bodily injury” quite familiar. The MPC defines “bodily injury” as “physical pain,
illness or any impairment of physical condition.”34 The authors of the MPC explain that the
definition of “bodily injury” was taken directly from the then-current Wisconsin statute, Wis. §
939.22(4), which defined “bodily harm” to mean “physical pain or injury, illness, or any
impairment of physical condition.” 35 The MPC’s authors explain that defining “bodily injury” in
this manner had two major benefits: First, it thus referred to more than the consequences of
direct attack, which included “pain, illness, or physical impairment caused indirectly, as, for
example, by exposing another to inclement weather or by non-therapeutic administration of a
drug or narcotic.” 36 Second, it excluded from liability under the assault offense “wrongs based
solely upon insult or emotional trauma,”37 which the authors felt could be punished under other
penal rationales.38
As for “serious bodily injury,” it was defined as “bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of
death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ.”39 Spread out categorically, the MPC’s definition of
“serious bodily injury” essentially is a of list three types of injuries:
1. Injury which creates a substantial risk of death;
2. Injury which causes serious permanent disfigurement;
3. Injury which causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ.
3B. Influence of Wisconsin Statutes
As for the origins of “Great Bodily Harm,” the MPC’s authors again indicate that they looked to
the Wisconsin statutes,40 which defined “great bodily harm” to mean “bodily injury which
creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which
causes a permanent or protected loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ or other serious bodily injury.”41 The authors indicate that they favored the Wisconsin
language because it “emcompasse[d] the drastic harms covered under the common-law felony of
mayhem and add[ed] a residual category of harm creating substantial risk of death.” 42 The
34

MPC § 210.0(2). It should be noted that, in providing the definitions of “bodily injury” and “serious bodily
injury,” the MPC adds the caveat “unless a different meaning plainly is required.” MPC § 210.0.
35
MPD § 211.1, Comment 3, page 187 (citing Wis. § 939.22(4) (1962)).
36
MPD § 211.1, Comment 3, page 187
37
MPD § 211.1, Comment 3, page 188
38
MPD § 211.1, Comment 3, page 188. See also MPD § 211.1, Comment 1(c), page 185 (noting that certain types
of “offense contact” should be punished, such as “indecent sexual advances,” “unwanted erotic touching,”
“disorderly conduct,” and “harassment,” and did indeed develop offenses that addressed this conduct directly).
39
MPC § 210.0(3).
40
MPD § 211.1, Comment 3, page 188
41
Wis. § 939.22(14).
42
MPD § 211.1, Comment 3, page 188
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language of the Wisconsin statute is quite similar to the ultimate MPC definitions except that, for
reasons entirely unexplained in the MPC comments, the authors dropped the definition’s catchall class of harm called “other serious bodily harm.”
3C. The Model Penal Code’s Influence on Minnesota
Minnesota was one of the first states to adopt the MPC, enacting the Minnesota Criminal Code in
1963.43 As a child of the MPC, it should be no surprise that 1963 Minnesota Code’s three
categories of assault have their origin in the MPC. At that time, following the MPC, the
Minnesota legislature distinguished between only three types of assault.44 The first type simply
was called “Assault” under Minn. Stat. § 609.22 (1963), the definition of which was identical to
the current definition of “assault”45 and the punishment of which was identical to the current
punishment of misdemeanor-level Assault in the Fifth Degree, up to 90 days of jail.46 The other
two types were felony offenses called “Aggravated Assault” under Minn. Stat. § 609.225 (1963).
The second type of assault required that the victim suffered “great bodily harm,” the definition of
which is identical to how it currently is defined,47 and was punishable up to ten years in prison.48
The third type required that the defendant commit the assault “with a dangerous weapon,” 49 the
forerunner to the current offense of Assault in the Second Degree, 50 and was punishable up to
five years in prison. Of course, when it came to sentencing, in a time before the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines and Blakely,51 the district court had much more sentencing discretion that
it does today. 52 Most notably in the 1963 Minnesota Criminal Code, there was no
“intermediate” degree of assault, such as the current Assault in the Third Degree, to split the
wide gulf between assaults that cause negligible bodily harm and those that just about kill the
victim.
Juxtaposing the MPC’s definition of “serious bodily injury” with the Minnesota Code’s “great
bodily harm” reveals that they are largely identical, with the differences being that the Minnesota
Code replaces the phrase “substantial risk of death” with “high probability of death;” adds the
adjective “permanent” to the phrase “protracted loss or impairment of the function;” and
supplements the definition with a catch-all class of harm called “other serious bodily harm.”
Thus, spread out categorically, the Minnesota Code’s definition of “Great Bodily Harm” is a list
of four types of injuries:

43

Minn. Stat. ch. 609 (1963), Session Laws, available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/data/revisor/law/1963/0/1963753.pdf (last accessed Oct. 2, 2012).
44
Compare MPC (1963) and Minn. Stat. ch. 609 (1963).
45
Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.22 (1963) and Minn. Stat. § 609.02 subd. 10 (2012).
46
Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.22 (1963) and Minn. Stat. § 609.224 subd. 1(2012).
47
Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8 (1963) and Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8(2012).
48
Minn. Stat. §609.225, subd. 1(1963)
49
Minn. Stat. § 609.225, subd. 2(1963)
50
Minn. Stat. § 609.222 (2012).
51
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004).
52
See Minn. Stat. § 609.10, § 609.135 (1963).
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1. Injury which creates a high probability of death;
2. Injury which causes serious permanent disfigurement;
3. Injury which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily member or organ; and
4. Other serious bodily harm.
In other words, while largely adopting the MPC in 1963, when choosing the definitions of the
severities of harm, Minnesota chose to adopt the exact wording of the Wisconsin statutes, rather
than the MPC’s innovations. Most notably, Minnesota chose to retain Wisconsin’s catch-all
“other serious bodily harm,” while the MPC dropped it.
The MPC and the resulting 1963 Minnesota Code are extraordinary in many ways, but, to a
practitioner who works within the current assault-offense regime, it can be surprising, perhaps
quaint, that neither code contains a concept analogous to “Substantial Bodily Harm” or seems to
address the “middle range” of bodily harm that often results from assaultive conduct. Indeed, to
modern ears, it may seem strange, if not downright unjust to hear that, from 1963 to 1979, a
defendant in Minnesota could break a victim’s arm, knock him unconscious, or render him
temporarily wheelchair-bound but receive only a misdemeanor conviction. When seeing these
sorts of injuries, a contemporary prosecutor might say, “This defendant may not need to go to
prison, but it definitely was felony-level conduct.” Not so, a generation ago…
3D. Rationale of the MPC
The absence of “Substantial Bodily Harm” or any analogous concept from the MPC or
Minnesota’s 1963 Code may suggest that there was a large “donut hole” of bodily harms that
were not addressed, or treated appropriately, by the Code’s authors. However, the MPC’s
authors certainly were not oblivious to the need to address the wide variety of human experience
and the “intermediate” types of bodily harm defined as “Substantial Bodily Harm.” Indeed, as
the authors explain in their notes, one of their primary concerns was to develop a system that
properly graded the wide range and variety of assaultive conduct.53 The authors stated that it
was “necessary for the Model Code to deal separately with conduct ranging from the simple
assault to the infliction of serious, permanent injury,” 54 i.e. “bodily injury short of homicide.”55
It also is clear that, when the authors were referring to “dealing . . . with” the range of assaultive
behavior, they were referring to the “grad[ing]” of assaultive conduct “ranging from a petty
misdemeanor to a felony of the second degree.” 56
Indeed, in comment 1(c) to MPC § 211.1, the authors explain that a problem at common law that
they sought to address through the Code was that “[a]ttacks resulting in injuries that fell short of

53

MPD § 211, Introductory Note.
MPD § 211. Introductory Note.
55
MPD § 211. Introductory Note.
56
MPD § 211. Introductory Note.
54
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mayhem” were treated as “ordinary batteries,”57 meaning low-level misdemeanors. The authors
explained that the lack of defined intermediate offenses required common-law judges to exercise
discretion in affixing proper punishment to more serious harms. 58 However, as “the practice
developed” to limit the potential punishments for misdemeanors, legislatures were compelled to
“respond[] by creating a series of intermediate offenses”59 to bridge the gap between “trivial[ly]
sanction[ed]” minor assaults and “drastic[ly] penal[ized] offenses such as murder and rape.”60
The MPC authors followed that trend, explaining that the adoption of a system of “laws that
grade various manifestations of causing . . . injury” was a “necessary part of a penal code.” 61
The MPC thus implemented the system previously described, explaining that their grading of
assault offenses was “rationalized according to the gravity of harm intended or causes and the
dangerousness of the mean used” and designed to provide commensurate penalties ranging from
a “maximum term of only 30 days” to a “maximum of 10 years.” 62
Even with this attention on the need to grade assault offenses appropriately, when it came to
establishing grades of physical harm, the MPC defined only two, and it is clear that the authors
felt that two was enough and that, despite the existence of other model statutory regimes that
contained three,63 a regime that had only two grades, along with the flexibility of sentencing
discretion, was “appropriate” and allowed for “very broad coverage.”64 In the MPC comments,
the authors are wholly and curiously silent on whether a level of harm in between “bodily injury”
and “serious bodily injury” was considered and, if so, why it was rejected.65
57

MPD § 211.1, Comment 1(c).
MPD § 211.1, Comment 1(c).
59
MPD § 211.1, Comment 1(c).
60
See MPD § 211.1, Comment 1(c). For example, the authors noted that New York “created four levels of offenses:
maiming (15 years); assault with a deadly weapon or a destructive or noxious thing (10 years); inflicting grievous
bodily harm or assault with any weapon (five years); and simple assault or batter (one year.).” Id. (citing N.Y.
§§240-245, 1400 (repealed 1967).
61
MPD § 211.1, Comment 1(c).
62
MPD § 211.1, Comment 1(c), page 184.
63
See MPC § 211.1, Comment 2, page 185-86 (describing the “proposed federal criminal code . . . [which]
intergrat[ed] all forms of assaultive behavior in a single provision . . . [and] define[d] separate offenses of maiming,
aggravated battery, and battery.”) and MPD § 211.1, Comment 1(c), pg. 181 (describing the then-current New York
§§240-245 which defined separate levels of punishment for (1) maiming; (2) inflicting grievous bodily harm or
assault; and (3) simple assault or battery).
64
MPC § 211.1, Comment 2, page 185
65
In addition to the authors’ direct description of the MPC assault regime as “appropriate” and “very broad,” the
tenor of the comments indicate that the goal of the code was to promote enough flexibility to fairly address the
variety of assaultive behavior. For example, the authors noted that some states had statutes distinguishing assaults
on special types of victims, as Minnesota’s current Assault in the Fourth Degree does. The authors then directly
addressed that the MPC did not enact an assault offense related to the status of the victim, stating that “[s]pecial
provision is unnecessary in view of the ample severity of penalties against murder and all serious attacks upon the
person, regardless of the identity of the victim.” MPC § 211.1, Comment 2, page 185. This comment suggests a
degree of confidence that the MPC provided flexibility to assign an offense-name and an appropriate penalty to any
assault. It’s easy to cut the MPC authors a break, given their enormous feat of collecting, summarizing, and taking
the best of the common law and various state statutes at the time to create the code. But it is apparent that the
authors felt that, if there was any need for an “intermediate” crime, it was to fill the space between mere “simple
assault” and homicide and that they did not see a need for and were not concerned with creating a crime that was
58
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3E. Changes to Minnesota’s Assault Statutes
After the enactment of the Minnesota Criminal Code, sixteen years passed without any changes
to the assault-statute regime. In 1979, the Code was substantially amended to create a new fourdegree regime,66 evincing perhaps that the legislature found the need for an intermediate felonylevel assault. What was formerly called “Aggravated Assault” and defined under Minn. Stat. §
609.225, subd. 1 (1963) was recast as “Assault in the First Degree” and moved to Minn. Stat. §
609.221 (1979). Its ten-year maximum penalty67 and the definition of “great bodily harm”
remained unchanged.68
The other type of felony-level assault, pertaining to an assault with a dangerous weapon under
Minn. Stat. § 609.225, subd. 2 (1963), was recast “Assault in the Second Degree” and moved to
Minn. Stat. § 609.222 (1979). Its penalty also remained the same.69
As for the misdemeanor-level assault found in the 1963 Code, which had simply been labeled
“Assault” under Minn. Stat. § 609.22 (1963), it was recast as “Assault in the Fourth Degree” and
relocated to Minn. Stat. § 609.224 (1979), but it otherwise remained the same.70
What was new in the 1979 was remarkable: the creation of a new felony offense that bridged the
gulf between the former “Assault” and “Aggravated Assault,” Assault in the Third Degree under
Minn. Stat. § 609.223 (1979). Assault in the Third Degree was defined then as it is now, an
assault that “inflicts substantial bodily harm.”71 “Substantial Bodily Harm” also was defined
then as it is now.”72 As one might expect for this intermediate-level assault, the legislature set its
maximum penalty at three years in prison.73
It is evident that the definition of “Substantial Bodily Harm,” like “Great Bodily Harm,” is just a
sub-list of types of injuries. Spread out categorically, the Minnesota Code’s definition of
“Substantial Bodily Harm” is a list of three types of injuries:
1. Injury which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement.
2. Injury which causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily member or organ; and
3. Injury which causes a fracture of any bodily member.

“intermediate” to Assault and Aggravated Assault. Obviously, in 1963, the Minnesota legislature agreed with the
MPC and passed its code.
66
Minn. Stat. ch. 609 (1963), Session Laws, available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/data/revisor/law/1979/0/1979258.pdf.
67
Minn. Stat. 609.221 (1979)
68
See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7 (1979).
69
See Minn. Stat. 609.222 (1979)
70
See Minn. Stat. 609.224 (1979)
71
See Minn. Stat. 609.223 (1979).
72
See Minn. Stat. 609.02, subd. 7a (1979).
73
Minn. Stat. 609.223 (1979).
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Beyond these words, however, the legislature provided no additional definitions to assist
prosecutors in determining what specific injuries fall within these types. All further
interpretation and elaboration had to be performed by prosecutors on an ad hoc basis and by the
appellate courts on a post hoc basis.74
Part 4: Appellate elaboration on the levels of harm
When compelled by an appeal, the Minnesota appellate courts have interpreted, attempted to
clarify, and attempted to delineate the three types of bodily harm. Almost exclusively, when
addressing one of the types of bodily harm, the issue before the court is whether the evidence
presented at a trial was sufficient to support the appellant’s conviction. Some decisions have
brought clarity, while other decisions tend to reveal why statutory reform may be a better
mechanism to increase clarity than reliance on appellate courts reviewing sufficiency-of-theevidence claims following jury verdicts.75
4A: Bodily Harm
The Minnesota appellate courts have not had to address “bodily harm” very often since 1963,
and, when they have, they have kept their opinions simple and have not diverted from the basic
philosophy of the MPC that some pain or injury must be present, as opposed to mere “offensive

74

Since 1979, this three-tiered gradation in the assault-statute regime has remained wholly intact and unmodified by
the legislature. That is not to say that the legislature has not amended the regime in a number of noteworthy ways,
including recasting misdemeanor-level assault as “Assault in the Fifth Degree,” Minn. Stat. § 609.224 (2012);
creating what is now Assault in the Fourth Degree to protect police officers and other civil servants, Minn. Stat. §
609.2231 (2012) and Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 2 (2012) (Providing a separate crime prohibiting use of deadly
force against peace officers and corrections employees); creating other felony offenses under the “Assault in the
Fourth Degree” title to punish assaults motivated by forms of racial and other bias, Minn. Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 4
(2012); creating the offense of Domestic Assault, Minn. Stat. § 609.2242 (2012); creating the concept of using a
defendant’s recidivism as a basis for enhancing misdemeanor-level assaults to gross-misdemeanor-level and felonylevel offenses, Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 2, 4 (2012); and creating a second type of Assault in the Second
Degree, Minn. Stat. § 609.22, subd. 2 (2012).
75
An obvious limitation in obtaining new detail from the appellate courts is that it is not their role to add new detail
in the first place. The canons of statutory interpretation dictate that “words and phrases are construed according to
the rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage,” Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2012), and the
courts have held that, “when the language is clear and unambiguous, [they] apply the plain meaning of the statute
and must not engage in any further statutory construction,” State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 525 (Minn. 2003).
It is hard for the courts to “gap-fill” statutes with this limitation.
Another limitation is that, when the courts have been asked to review the definitions of the types of bodily
harm, the standard of review on a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim does not easily allow the court to attempt to
demarcate clear lines between the levels of harm. Review of these claims puts the courts in a posture which requires
them to weigh all evidence in favor of the conviction and show extreme deference to the jury’s verdict. See State v.
Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 477, 477 (Minn. 1999).
Also, from a practitioner’s point of view, relying on direction from appellate courts is a slow, inefficient
way to learn what the legislature intends to criminalize. Metaphors abound: It’s akin to learning whether the flag
will fly by “running it up the flagpole.” It’s akin to testing the suspension of a car by driving off a cliff. And, when
faced with the interpretative task of applying the reasoning in sufficiency-of-the-evidence decisions to a new set of
facts, it’s far too often akin to the ancient art of reading tea leaves.
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contact.” 76 As for specific physical pain or injury, the courts have not addressed a set of facts
which resulted in distinguishing mere “offensive contact” from “bodily harm.” But it is clear
from cases such as State v. Tsheu that “only a minimal amount of physical pain or injury is
necessary in order to satisfy the definition of ‘bodily harm.’”77 The courts have addressed
several cases in which the claimed harm constitutes victim’s mere description of pain or a bruise,
which the courts have found to be sufficient evidence of bodily harm. For example, in State v.
Johnson, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence of bodily harm when the victim
experienced pain from being struck.”78 “Physical pain or injury can be established when a victim
subjectively feels pain, even if there are no actual signs of injury.”79 As for demonstrable
physical injuries, even slight injuries qualify as bodily harm: In State v. Mattson, the court found
sufficient evidence of physical injury based on evidence that the victim suffered a bruise,80 and,
in State v. Slaughter, scratches on a victim’s neck constituted bodily harm.81
As for the other types of bodily harm, namely “illness” and “any impairment of physical
condition,” the appellate courts have been asked to interpret either category of harm in only one
case, involving a defendant who drugged a victim.82 It’s clear from a review of appellate

76

When designing MPC’s assault-offense regime, the MPC authors took note that they sought to depart from prior
law by “limiting assault to cases involving either the fact or prospect of physical injury.” They explained that
“[m]ere offensive contact was excluded” from the definition of assault. MPD § 211.1, Comment 2, page 185. Note,
however, that the authors were well aware that certain types of “offense contact” should be punished, such as
“indecent sexual advances,” “unwanted erotic touching,” “disorderly conduct,” and “harassment,” and did indeed
develop offenses that addressed this conduct directly. Id.
77
State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d N.W.2d 849, 859 (Minn. 2008) (quoting State v. Jarvis, 665 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn.
2003).
78
State v. Johnson, 277 Minn. 230, 237, 152 N.W.2d 768, 773 (1967). See also State v. Bowser, 307 N.W.2d 778,
779 (Minn. 1991) (holding that evidence that the victim suffered bodily harm after experiencing physical pain with
sexual penetration and receiving an accompanying laceration that resulted in bleeding was sufficient to support a
finding of bodily harm).
79
State v. Bowser, 307 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Minn. 1981).
80
State v. Mattson, 376 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Minn. 1985); State v. Nordstrum, 385 N.W.2d 348, 351-52 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (same). See also State v. Johnson, 392 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that evidence that
defendant struck victim in the face, knocking her down and causing her to sustain bruises to her harm and knee and
a bloody knee was sufficient to support a conviction for assault in the fifth degree); State v. O’Brien, 352 N.W.2d
130 (Minn. App. 1984) (holding that evidence that appellant punched victim in the face, causing a cut, was
sufficient to support a conviction for assault in the fifth degree).
81
State v. Slaughter, 691 N.W.2d 70, 776 (Minn. 2005).
82
State v. Jarvis, 665 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Minn. 2003). A review of appellate decisions did not reveal any cases
which further defined or discussed “illness,” and, prior to 2003, with the Jarvis decision, the courts “ha[d] not had
occasion to address the type of evidence needed to support a finding of ‘impairment of physical condition’ as a type
of bodily harm.” Id. In Jarvis, there was evidence that the defendant provided pills to an unsuspecting female
victim, claiming that they were “vitamins.” Id. at 519. The pills, however, caused her side effects that were not
anticipated by the victim, causing her to become “disoriented,” “groggy,” and unable to move her body without
assistance. Id. at 522. Testimony from a forensic scientist revealed the presence of barbiturate drugs in the victim’s
system after the incident. Id. at 520. The court reviewed whether the evidence was sufficient to find that the victim
suffered “bodily harm.” Id. at 521-22. The court reviewed the Webster’s definition of “impair” and held that “any
impairment of physical condition in Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7, means any injury that weakens or damages an
individual’s physical condition.” Id. at 522 (citing Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 959
(Wendayln R. Nichols & Sheryl B. Stebbins eds., 2d ed. 2001)) (emphasis added). The court found that the
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decisions that few appellants have sought reversal of conviction based on the lack of evidence of
bodily harm, and there is very little related to this type of harm on which practitioners trifle.
4B “Substantial Bodily Harm”
Surprisingly, the appellate courts have not provided much more guidance on the definition of
“substantial bodily harm.” In fact, in 2003, the court of appeals conceded that “few Minnesota
cases specifically define substantial bodily harm.”83 To review the decisions that do exist, it
seems appropriate to look at each of the three categories of “substantial bodily harm” separately.
4B(1): Temporary but Substantial Disfigurement
The first category of injuries, those which would constitute “temporary but substantial
disfigurement,” has been discussed several times. In 1981, in State v. Carlson, the supreme court
reviewed a case in which a ten-year-old victim was beaten by her father and suffered “two black
eyes, facial bruises, bruises on her neck and head, and scratches on her arm.”84 With virtually no
discussion and no elaboration on the concept of “temporary but substantial disfigurement,” the
court held that these injuries constituted “substantial bodily harm.” Five years later, though, in
1986, the issue of whether an injury that involved a black eye constituted substantial bodily harm
came up again, and the demarcation line became fuzzy. In State v. Whaley, the appellant was
convicted of Assault in the Third Degree after punching the victim in the face, causing the victim
to suffer a black eye, a swollen face, and a fractured left cheekbone.85 In the prosecutor’s closing
argument, the prosecutor argued, “Let’s look at the disfigurement, first of all. You saw the
photos of the victim. This, ladies and gentlemen, is disfigurement. When you have a black eye
and your face is swollen, that is disfigurement.”86 Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s
argument, citing it as a misstatement of the law.87 Without citing precedent, the court noted that,
“under Minnesota law a black eye, in and of itself, does not equate to ‘substantial bodily
harm.’”88 The inference prompted by the holding, of course, is that a black eye, in and of itself,
is not “temporary but substantial disfigurement.”89 However, there has never been any
discussion about why that or any black eye would never constitute substantial disfigurement.
The two cases compel the question: Why is a black eye with accompanying bruises and scratches
sufficient evidence to prove substantial bodily harm when a black eye with accompanying facial
evidence amply supported a finding that the victim’s physical condition was “weakened or damaged by an
involuntary ingestion of drugs.” Id.
83
State v. Dunn, 2003 WL 282454, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2003).
84
State v. Carlson, 369 N.W.2d 326, 327 (Minn. App. 1985).
85
State v. Whaley, 38 N.W.2d 919 (Minn. App. 1986). Note that the fractured cheekbone was a sufficient injury to
sustain the conviction for Assault in the Third Degree. Id. at 927. This case is discussed here for the court’s
comment on the black eye.
86
Id. at 926.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
The court nevertheless sustained the conviction, holding that the fractured cheek bone was a “fracture,” which
qualifies as substantial bodily harm. Id. at 927.
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swelling is insufficient? The word “substantial” has been defined as “considerable size or
amount,”90 but no court has sought to demarcate why a black eye is distinguishable from other
forms of disfigurement. Can one easily quantify these sorts of facial injuries? When reviewing a
case involving injuries such as bruises, scratches, and swelling, practitioners essentially are left
with the vague holdings of Carlson and Whaley and left to infer their penumbra and import in
other cases. The situation seems unnecessarily arbitrary.91
Another common type of injury which is discussed under the concept of “temporary but
substantial disfigurement” is a laceration which requires stitches. Unfortunately, though, the
court of appeals has never addressed whether a laceration that requires stitches constitutes per se
“temporary but substantial disfigurement.” Moreover, in cases where the court of appeals has
reviewed injuries requiring stitches, the court has chosen to not publish their opinions, offering
no precedential guidance to practitioners.92 For example, in State v. Wines, an unpublished case,
the court recognized a “large deep cut” near the victim’s right eyebrow, which was described as
a 1.5-inch, L-shaped laceration that had to be sutured, as “temporary but substantial
disfigurement.93 In State v. Smith, an unpublished case, the court held that a “3-inch bleeding
laceration on [the victim’s] scalp requiring 10-15 staples, along with a concussion and
accompanying amnesia at the time of the assault” established substantial bodily harm.94 In In re
Welfare of A.B.R., an unpublished case, the court held that a laceration on a victim’s forearm that
was 2.5-inches long, was 1-1.5-centemeters deep, and required seven stitches to repair
constituted temporary but substantial disfigurement.95
This series of unpublished cases may endow practitioners with some confidence in evaluating a
laceration which requires stitches, but certainly there is no published case that holds that a
laceration that is repaired with stitches or sutures constitutes substantial bodily harm. Also, these
cases do not provide any sense that stitches or sutures would be required. Indeed, although
stitches may be some sort of indicator that the laceration has “considerable size or amount,” the
court has never held that medical intervention or evidence is necessary.96

90

E.g., State v. Williams; 451 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. App. 1990);
Anecdotally, one way that prosecutors have established that a black eye constitutes substantial bodily harm is to
introduce evidence, when possible, that the injury to the eye caused temporary but substantial impairment to the
victim’s vision.
92
See Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
93
State v. Wimes, 1992 WL 383419 at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1992).
94
State v. Smith, 1996 WL 380571, at * 2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 9, 1996),
95
In re Welfare of A.B.R., 2007 WL 4564151, at *10 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2007).
96
See State v. Dunn, 2003 WL 282454, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2003). In Dunn, the court refused to overturn
a jury’s finding of substantial bodily harm when the only evidence of injury was a set of photographs of lacerations
on the victim’s face and head and evidence of bleeding at the crime scene. Id. Of course, Dunn remains an
unpublished case with no precedential value, and the legal issue on appeal was sufficiency of the evidence, requiring
the court to give high deference to the jury and review the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction. Id.
at 2-4. But, there it is, usable or unusable, perhaps an opinion on which no judgment, e.g. a charging decision,
should rely.
91
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4B(2): Temporary but Substantial Loss or Impairment of the
Function of Any Bodily Member or Organ
The second category, “temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ,” has been discussed infrequently by the appellate courts. Even as late as 2001,
the court of appeals, in State v. Larkin, had not been asked to consider whether a loss of
consciousness constituted “substantial bodily harm.”97 In short shrift, however, the court
determined (1) rendering someone unconscious temporarily impairs “a function of the brain, that
is, the ability to receive and interpret sensory impulses” and (2) because loss of consciousness is
a “total” impairment of sensory brain function, it is thus “substantial.”98 Thus, the court
concluded that “temporary loss of consciousness, on its own, is substantial bodily harm for the
purposes of [Assault in the Third Degree.]”99
4B(3): Fracture of Any Bodily Member
The third category, “fracture of any bodily member,” appears to be the most illuminated type of
injury, by virtue of several straightforward statements in several published cases, e.g. in State v.
Stafford,100 when the victim’s nose was broken; State v. Wellman, when the victim’s nose was
broken and two bones were broken;101 State v. Witucki, when the victim suffered a broken
finger;102 State v. Whaley, when the victim suffered a fractured cheekbone;103 or State v. Waino,
when the victim’s ribs were cracked.104
The aforementioned cases constitute essentially all of the appellate case law in Minnesota
associated with interpreting the meaning of “substantial bodily harm.” If a prosecutor reviews a
case involving an injury not specifically discussed in the cases, such as a burn or a concussion, or
an impairment not specifically discussed, such as the temporary loss of sight due to a black eye
or difficulty chewing due to a sore jaw, then the prosecutor must simply teach the definition of
“substantial bodily harm” to the jury and argue her cause. Many prosecutors may consider trying
a case on a novel or uncharted theory to be a joyful way to spend one’s workweek, but, from the
perspective of a “minister of justice,” on the mathematical issue of whether an injury should
“count” as substantial bodily harm, many prosecutors simply want more clarity in the statute.
97

State v. Larkin, 620 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Minn. App. 2001). For the sake of nuance, it is noteworthy that the
supreme court in 1983 opined without discussion, “Arguably, ‘great bodily harm’ is inflicted if one knocks someone
out briefly . . . .” State v. Stafford, 340 N.W.2d 669, 670 (Minn. 1983) (citing State v. Jones, 266 N.W.2d 706 (Minn.
1978).
98
Id.
99
Id. A noteworthy omission in Larkin is that, although the victim also suffered a concussion, the court chose to not
discuss whether a concussion on its own could be considered substantial bodily harm, a question that remains
unanswered by the Minnesota appellate courts.
100
State v. Stafford, 340 N.W.2d 670-71 (Minn. 1983).
101
State v. Wellman, 341 N.W.2d 561 (Minn. 1983) (defendant convicted of three separate counts of Assault in the
Third Degree for three assaults that occurred on separate occasions).
102
State v. Witucki, 420 N.W.2d 217, 221 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
103
Whaley, 38 N.W.2d at 927.
104
State v. Waino, 611 N.W.2d 575 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
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4C: “Great Bodily Harm”
In contrast to “bodily harm” and “substantial bodily harm,” there is more appellate litigation on
the various forms of “great bodily harm,” although it is not clear that more case law has led to
more clarity. In most cases, courts review each category of bodily harm separately, 105 and, in
any given case, an injury may satisfy one category but not another. When dealing with cases
involving great bodily harm, it is common to see a case in which a victim’s injuries qualify under
more than one of the four categories, e.g. when a permanently-disfiguring wound also causes a
high-probability of death.106 Sometimes, an appellate court will work deliberately through each
category of great bodily harm;107 other times, a court will appear to leave its holding purposely
vague.108 In many cases, it seems obvious that the court’s goal is simply to decide the
sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue in the case before it, not to impart any guidance to practitioners
whatsoever. Yet, most practitioners still will try to rely on the case law that does exist for
whatever guidance and grounding can be inferred.
4C(1): High Probability of Death
When looking at the first category of great bodily harm, “high probability of death,” the
appellate courts have focused on the fact that the injury itself must be life-threatening; the injury
cannot simply be a “near-miss.” The courts have noted that, because the distinguishing
characteristic of Minnesota’s assault statutes is the severity of the victim’s injury, there will be
times when a person who commits a “grievous assault” will escape serious assault charges
simply “because the victim is fortunate enough to escape serious injury.”109 It’s a constraint
created “by the language of the statute.”110
For example, in State v. Gerald, the court considered a half-inch laceration on the victim’s ear
which, according to medical testimony, was very close to a major vein and artery.111 The state
argued that, if the vein or artery had been cut, the victim could have bled to death. The appellant
was convicted at trial. On appeal, however, the court reasoned that “[t]he fact that a lesser injury
is located near a major organ or vessel and therefore could have been more serious is not
105

The supreme court has not always followed this practice. See, e.g., State v. Peters, 274 Minn. 309, 143 N.W.2d
832 (Minn. 1966) (holding that facial injuries suffered by a police officer in a pistol-whipping assault constituted
great bodily harm without specifying in detail the officer’s injuries or the category of great bodily harm the injuries
satisfies); State v. Johnson, 322 N.W.2d 358, 359 (Minn. 1982) (holding that unspecified injuries that the victim
received when the appellant beat him in the head multiple times with a two-foot-long pipe were sufficient to support
the appellant’s conviction of assault in the first degree).
106
See, e.g., State v. Felix, 410 N.W.2d 398 (Minn. App. 1987) (“This case did not simply involve one of the factors
defining ‘great bodily harm;’ it involved all of them.).
107
See, e.g., State v. Gerald, 486 N.W.2d 799, 802-03 (Minn. App. 1992)
108
See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 322 N.W.2d 358, 359 (Minn. 1982)
109
State v. Gerald, 486 N.W.2d 799, 802-03 (Minn. App. 1992) (“Although we find it anomalous that an individual
who commits a grievous assault on another may escape a first degree assault conviction because the victim is
fortunate enough to escape serious injury, we are constrained by the language of the statute.”).
110
State v. Gerald, 486 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Minn. App. 1992)
111
State v. Gerald, 486 N.W.2d 799, 801-02 (Minn. App. 1992).
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sufficient to satisfy the statut[ory] definition of high probability of death.”112 Again, a “nearmiss,” under Gerald, will not constitute great bodily harm. The injury must be a “nearly-killedhim.”
The court, in State v. Anderson, was far clearer about what they would deem to be a qualifying
injury.113 There, the victim suffered a laceration to his liver, and a physician testified at trial that
the laceration was a “life-threatening” injury and testified that it was “a serious injury because if
the bleeding does not stop or is not stopped, a person can bleed and die.”114
Compared to the other categories of “great bodily harm,” and thanks to the opinions in Gerald
and Anderson, the concept of “high probability of death” probable is workable as is. With the
assistance of medical expertise, it’s quite possible for jurors to evaluate questions regarding
“How close to death was the victim?” and “How urgent was the medical intervention?”
4C(2): Serious Permanent Disfigurement
When looking at the second category, serious permanent disfigurement, we again see a handful
of published cases, and there are a few curious unpublished cases as well.
Most of the cases pertain to significant lacerations and their resulting permanent scars. In State
v. Anderson, a case from 1985, the court held that a jury could find that a single scar running the
length of the victim’s upper body qualified as serious permanent disfigurement.115 In State v.
Currie, a 1987 case, the court held that numerous scars on the backs of child victims from being
whipped with an extension cord supported the conclusion that the defendant inflicted great
bodily harm.116 So, as of 1987, a single long scar on the upper body or numerous scars on the
back were deemed sufficient evidence of great bodily harm.
Moving forward to 1992, when the court was asked to review the two half-inch scars on the
victim’s neck and ear in State v. Gerald, the court held that they did not constitute “serious
permanent disfigurement.”117 The court stated that the two scars were “relatively small and in
areas where they are not particularly noticeable” and added “the scars are significantly less
extensive and pronounced that those reviewed [in Anderson and Currie.]”118 The casecomparison found in Gerald is somewhat helpful in identifying the demarcation line of “serious
permanent disfigurement.” As of 1992, one could accept that the scars in Gerald were not great
bodily harm because they were smaller than those in Anderson, fewer than those in Currie, and
were less noticeable, assuming that one does not take into account the victim’s ability to cover
scars with clothing.
112

Id. at 802.
See State v. Anderson, 370 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. App. 1985).
114
Id.
115
State v. Anderson, 370 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. Sept. 19, 1985).
116
State v. Currie, 400 N.W.2d 361, 364, 366 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 1987).
117
State v. Gerald, 486 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. App. 1992).
118
Id.
113
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But then three years later, in State v. McDaniel, the court of appeals held that a scar on the
victim’s right center chest which was “two-thirds of an inch long” and a scar on his upper-right
neck which was “six centimeters long” constituted “serious permanent disfigurement.”119
Contrasting the injuries with those in Gerald, the court said that the scars on the victim’s body in
McDaniel are “larger and prominently located.”120 It is unclear from the opinions why the court
believed that a scar on one’s chest or the “upper-right” of the neck is more “prominently” located
than on one’s ear or the back of one’s neck. It’s also unclear why the court felt that the 3/4 inch
scar on the victim’s chest in McDaniel was so profoundly larger than the two 1/2 inch scars on
the victim in Gerald. Moreover, there is no indication in any of these cases, and no reason to
believe, that the court ever had an opportunity to see the injuries in the other cases.
The court of appeals followed McDaniels three years later with an unpublished decision in State
v. Bernal, which involved an assault with a beer bottle which caused a severe facial laceration
and severed tragus of the ear, which required forty stitches to repair, and which left a prominent
circular scar on the victim’s face.121 The court appeared to acknowledge the obvious, that the
injuries were more severe than those present in Gerald but also acknowledged that the victim’s
injuries were not as severe as the victims in Currie or Anderson.122 Then, with little analysis, the
court stated that the injuries were “easily comparable” to the injuries in McDaniels and, on that
basis, found sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict.123 It is difficult, if not impossible, to
take stock of McDaniels and Bernal and get a clear sense of why those injuries are so similar and
why they both constitute serious permanent disfigurement. By 1998, then, the lines of
demarcation in this category were getting fuzzier.
The fuzziness on this issue became even more obvious in 2003, when the court of appeals
reviewed the victim’s injuries in State v. Demers to see whether they were sufficient to sustain a
first-degree assault conviction.124 The court’s opinion in Demers probably best reveals that there
is no clear indication of what size or prominence a wound must be to be considered serious
permanent disfigurement.
In Demers, the female victim was stabbed in the abdomen, leaving her with two permanent scars
on her abdomen above her navel, below her rib cage.125 “One scar is one-half to one inch in
length; the other is three inches in length. [The victim] testified that because of these scars she is
embarrassed to wear a two-piece bathing suit or expose her stomach.”126 The court cited
McDaniels, Anderson, and Gerald, but there was no discussion of how the court compared the
injuries to the victim in Demers to the injuries of the other victims. The court simply said,
119

State v. McDaniel, 534 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
Id.
121
State v. Bernal, 1998 WL 15905, *4 (Minn. App. Jan. 20, 1998).
122
Id.
123
Id. at *5.
124
State v. Demers, 2003 WL 22952813, *1 (Minn. App. Dec. 16, 2003), review denied (Minn. Feb. 25, 2004).
125
Id.
126
Id.
120
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“Depending on her attire, [the victim]’s scars are visible and fall within the range of those
considered great bodily harm as discussed in case law. We therefore conclude that the district
court did not clearly err in finding that [her] scars constitute great bodily harm.”127
If there is an Exhibit #1 to prove why waiting for sufficiency-of-the-evidence appellate decisions
is a poor way to clarify the assault statutes, Demers would be it. It strains credulity to believe
that, somehow, the size and prominence of the respective injuries in Gerald and Demers should
lead to amazingly different outcomes, considering the sentencing drop-off from a conviction for
Assault in the First Degree to a conviction for Assault in the Third Degree.128 The juxtaposition
can cause a conscientious prosecutor to err on the side of caution and choose to not charge
someone with Assault in the First Degree when the injury is somewhere in the
Gerald/Demers/McDaniels-degree of injuries. One might call the prosecutor’s caution “lenity”
or “prudence,” but, if a defendant is not being held accountable for an offense that should be-- or
that the legislators or “the public” believe is-- a First-Degree-Assault-level harm, then the
prosecutor’s “caution” is another word for injustice. And it would be injustice created by the
opacity of the statute.129
Leaving the difficulties of the laceration-and-scar cases aside, in State v. Ali, the court of appeals
reviewed a case in which the appellate bit “nearly one inch off the tip of the victim’s finger.”130
At trial, the victim’s “treating physician referred to the injury as a ‘partial amputation’ of the

127

Id.
Ironically, Gerald is still cited for the proposition that a scar’s seriousness may depend on its size and location.
See, e.g, State v. Moua, 2012 WL 2505744, *4 (Minn. App. July 2, 2012) (holding that the victim’s facial scar was
sufficient evidence of “serious permanent disfigurement” because it required a deep layer of sutures, was biteshaped, was in a prominent location, and was noticeable when she testified).
129
For the reader’s benefit, it should be noted that the appellate courts have tried to clarify other, peripheral issues
involving scars and “permanent disfigurement:” First, in Anderson, the appellant argued that the scar was not
“permanent” because the victim could remove (and testified that she was considering removing) the scar by plastic
surgery. Anderson, 370 N.W.2d at 706. The court curtly rejected that argument with no comment, id., perhaps
implying that medical interventions that could cover the disfigurement should not be considered when evaluating the
injury. Of course, the import of this is very unclear: For example, what about cases in which a victim’s teeth are
knocked out but then later re-inserted by a dentist? Is a prosecutor and juror supposed to ignore that the teeth are not
gone? Or, does the dentist’s replacing the teeth reduce a “permanent loss” to a mere “temporary loss,” perhaps
reduce the seriousness of an assault from an Assault in the First Degree to an Assault in the Third Degree?
Second, in In re R.L.A., an unpublished case, the appellant successfully argued that expert medical
testimony was needed to establish whether a facial laceration requiring over 200 stitches and resulting in extensive
scarring constituted permanent disfigurement. In re R.L.A., 1988 WL 56303, *1 (Minn. App. June 7, 1988). The
court opined that, because the trial took place only six months since the incident, “[a]lthough easily observed, only
an expert could knowledgeably ascertain the permanence of six-month old scars,” refusing to believe that a lay
person could conclude that such a scar would not go away. Id. (emphasis added).
Third, courts hold a defendant responsible for any permanent disfiguring injuries that result from medical
intervention following an assault, e.g. surgical scars left during treatment of other injuries directly received in an
assault. State v. Anderson, 370 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. App. 1995) (holding appellant responsible for causing the
serious and permanently disfiguring surgical scar); State v. Curry, 2010 WL 175267 (Minn. App. May 4, 2010)
(same).
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State v. Ali, 752 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (May 27, 2009).
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victim’s finger starting just above the base of the fingernail.”131 The court concluded “the loss of
the tip of a finger is “serious permanent disfigurement.”132
4C(3): Serious Permanent or Protracted Loss or Impairment of the
Function of Any Bodily Member or Organ
When looking at the third category, permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function
of any bodily member or organ, the appellate courts again have reviewed only a few notable
cases. The infrequency of cases may be because half of the injuries covered in this category,
“loss of . . . any bodily member or organ,” are so obvious than no appellate attorney would dare
raise a claim that the evidence would be insufficient. In other words, there likely could be little
dispute than the loss of a body part such as an arm, ear, or kidney would not constitute great
bodily harm. A notable baseline case did arise in 2008, however, when the court reviewed State
v. Ali, in which the appellant bit off “nearly one inch off the tip of the victim’s finger.” 133 In a
sign that the court will construe “bodily member” fairly broadly, even though the victim lost only
the part of his finger “just above the base of the fingernail,” the court held that this loss
constituted permanent loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member.134
A more interesting type of injury discussed under this category relates to impairment of bodily
functions due to nerve damage. One can look again to State v. Gerald, in which the state argued
that the lacerations to the victim’s face that caused him to experience a “tightening or sensation”
when he yawned or chewed qualified as a permanent loss or impairment.135 The court disagreed,
holding that the evidence was insufficient to support such a finding.136 In explaining its decision,
the court noted that medical testimony revealed that the victim’s “ability to perform bodily
functions such as hear, chew, eat or breathe were not impaired by the injuries.”137 So, clearly, by
1992, it was clear that, to be a victim under this category of harm, a victim must experience more
than merely a tightening in his jaw when yawning and eating.
By 2004, in the unpublished State v. Jones case, the court encountered more nerve damage.138
The injuries suffered by the victim in Jones were similar to those found in Gerald, but the court
found them sufficient to prove “protected and possibly permanent loss or impairment of his
facial nerves” and thus great bodily harm.139 In Jones, the victim was hit in the head with a
131
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Id. (holding that the injury is a “serious permanent disfigurement” or “permanent loss or impairment of the
function” of a bodily member”) (citing Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8).
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State v. Ali, 752 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (May 27, 2009).
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Id. (holding that the injury is a “serious permanent disfigurement” or “permanent loss or impairment of the
function” of a bodily member”) (citing Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8). See also State v. Stapek, 315 N.W.2d 603
(Minn. 1982) (holding that “permanent damage to the [victim]s reproductive organs” constituted great bodily harm).
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State v. Gerald, 486 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
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State v. Jones, 2004 WL 1925052 at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2004).
139
State v. Jones, 2004 WL 1925052 at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2004).
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baseball bat.140 Several weeks after the incident, the victim had “dysfunction of the left frontal
branch of his facial nerves” and decreased sensation in his left anterior cheek.141 Five months
after the incident, when the trial took place, the victim still experienced numbness on the left side
of his face, loss of sensation on his left cheek, and difficulty talking, and he could not raise his
left eyebrow.142 Medical testimony at trial indicated that the victim’s injuries “could take up to
two years to heal or may never heal.”143 Faced with this set of injuries, the court found that the
victim’s injuries satisfied the element of great bodily harm.144
Beyond nerve damage, the most interesting type of injury discussed under this category relates to
the total loss of a tooth. Rather than treat tooth loss as a mere “fracture,” the court stated in State
v. Bridgeforth that evidence that a victim lost a tooth in an assault was sufficient to prove great
bodily harm. 145 That is, rather than treat a tooth as simply a part of the skeletal system, the court
surmised that, if a nose is a bodily member, as was concluded in State v. Stafford, then a tooth
also must be a bodily member.146 Indeed, the court then concluded in one sentence: “[T]he loss
of a tooth is a permanent loss of the function of a bodily member.” The Bridgeforth holding is
interesting because it has been the precedent used by practitioners for years in drawing the
conclusion that, if a defendant busts a victim’s tooth out, he is guilty of Assault in the First
Degree. Indeed, it is one of the most common injuries that can transform what appears to be a
one-punch-misdemeanor-assault case to a full-blown prison-commit First-Degree-Assault felony
trial.147
It must be noted, however, that, in 2005, in State v. Moore, the supreme court placed a giant
asterisk on the Bridgeforth decision.148 Moore was a case involving a first-degree-assault
conviction arising from an assault in which the victim lost a tooth.149 At trial, the district court
followed Bridgeforth and instructed the jury that “the loss of a tooth is a permanent loss of the
function of a bodily member.”150 On appeal, the supreme court overturned the conviction, citing
an error in the jury instructions.151 The supreme court stated that, by instructing the jury in that
matter, it removed the question of whether the loss of a tooth is “great bodily harm” from the
jury’s consideration, which was reversible error.152 The supreme court then clarified that
140
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Bridgeforth only stands for the proposition that the loss of a tooth provides a sufficient evidence
for a first-degree-assault conviction.153 It does not mean that, as a matter of law, a loss of a tooth
is great bodily harm. Leaving the fact-question/legal-question aside, the dilemma in Moore is
another excellent example of why Minnesota should not be using sufficiency-of-the-evidence
cases to clarify its assault statutes. Essentially, it leads practitioners to say, “The supreme court
has decided that a loss of a tooth is great bodily harm, but it would be reversible error to tell
jurors that it is. The parties will have to just argue about it and let the jurors decide that for
themselves.” It’s an absurd conundrum, compounded by the thought of the unfortunate
conversation that the prosecutor in Moore would have had with the victim when explaining why
there would have to be a second trial.
4C(4): Other Serious Bodily Harm
When looking at the fourth category, “other serious bodily harm,” the appellate courts have
found that very disparate injuries (or, more accurately, collections of injuries) can satisfy the
statute. The courts have relied on this category as a sort of “catch all” category that allows the
affirmation of a conviction through a finding that “at the very least” a victim’s injuries “fit within
the phrase ‘other serious bodily harm.’”154 The courts emphasize that, even if an injury does not
fit into the other categories of great bodily harm, for an injury to be considered “other serious
bodily harm,” it must be “in the same kind or class” as the other three categories of injuries
stated with particularity in the statute.155 There is little discussion on what the “same kind or
case” would be because what the courts have ended up seeing on appeal typically has not been
just a single injury to consider. Instead, the courts have been confronted with cases involving
victims that suffered numerous injuries which, in themselves, would not be great bodily harm
but, taken together, warrant the maximum prosecution of a First-Degree-Assault charge (and the
presumptive prison-commit sentence that the assault deserves).
In State v. Jones, the court held that there was sufficient evidence of other serious bodily harm
when the victim was found unconscious, was hospitalized for a week, and suffered numbness,
dizziness, and headaches.156 On its own, loss of consciousness is considered substantial bodily
harm, but, when it is accompanied by all of the injuries the victim in Jones suffered, the court
found the collection of injuries to be great bodily harm.
Similarly, in State v. Anderson, the court concluded that “a lacerated liver, a laceration on her
head which required stitches, bruises, other head injuries which caused lapses of consciousness,
and a long scar running the length of her upper body” would qualify as “other serious bodily
harm.” 157
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However, when reviewing the injuries to the victim in Gerald, which again were just two halfinch lacerations on the head, the court held that, even if stitches are required to repair the
injuries, they would not constitute “great bodily harm.”158
Following Jones, the court in State v. Barner reviewed an assault in which the victim the
evidence revealed:
Defendant in this case hit the victim so hard in the head that the
victim's head swelled up, making it difficult for him to eat for three
days; defendant inflicted multiple stab wounds, one 4 inches deep
and the rest 2 inches deep, leaving multiple scars; and defendant
injured the victim's hand in such a way as to affect the way the
victim, an avid canoeist, paddles his canoe.159
Rather than proceed with a discussion of each category of great bodily harm, the court, quoting
Jones, wrote “‘[a]t the very least’ . . . the injuries ‘fit within the phrase ‘other serious bodily
harm.’’”160
This sort of cursory conclusion, of course, leaves a great deal on which to speculate, and curious
prosecutors are left to wonder whether, on their own, injuries leading to difficulty with eating or
paddling would be sufficient to proceed on a charge of First Degree Assault. However, in the
least, one can see the benefit of the catch-all category when facing a case involving a complex
multiple-injury assault. Rather than seeing a set or series of Fifth Degree or Third Degree
Assaults, a prosecutor can charge a defendant with a single count of First Degree Assault.
Perhaps, this is the singular justification for the category anyway.
Part 5: Wisconsin
Following a discussion of the Minnesota assault-statute regime, Wisconsin’s regime should be
familiar territory. Like Minnesota, Wisconsin’s criminal code has three levels of assault which
differ only in regard to three levels of injury suffered by the victim, and those levels of injury are
called “bodily harm,” “substantial bodily harm,” and “great bodily harm.”161 Assaults causing
bodily harm are misdemeanors, and assaults causing either substantial or great bodily harm are
felonies.162 Also, Minnesota and Wisconsin share identical definitions of “bodily harm” and
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State v. Barner, 510 N.W.2d 202, 202 (Minn. 1993).
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“great bodily harm.”163 With all of this similarity, what is so special about our neighbors to the
east? It’s their definition of “substantial bodily harm,” which gets rid of all of the tea-leaf
reading and talk of “temporary but substantial” injuries.
5A: Wisconsin’s “Substantial Bodily Harm”
In its definition of “substantial bodily harm,” the Wisconsin legislature created a list of
qualifying injuries that it wanted to be considered sufficient for a felony charge. In Wisconsin,
“substantial bodily harm” means “bodily injury that causes a laceration which requires stitches,
staples, or a tissue adhesive; any fracture of a bone; a broken nose; a burn; a petechial; a
temporary loss of consciousness; sight or hearing; a concussion; or a loss or fracture of a
tooth.”164
Rather than using the “temporary but substantial” language found in Minnesota’s definition of
substantial bodily harm and asking prosecutors and jurors to figure out whether an injury fits
under the statute, Wisconsin eliminates that interpretive step. By “cutting out the middle man,”
Wisconsin makes the mathematics easier and less subject to ambiguity and misinterpretation.
The benefits should be immediately obvious. Instead of fiddling with whether a particular
laceration should qualify as “temporary but substantial disfigurement,” the Wisconsin legislature
simply lists that any laceration which requires stitches, staples, or a tissue adhesive is substantial
bodily harm. In Minnesota, it is common for prosecutors to believe that a laceration which
requires stitches is substantial bodily harm, to charge a case on that belief, and to proceed to trial
with that belief. However, as the statute and case law stand, the prosecutor still must argue that
such a laceration fits the words “temporary but substantial disfigurement,” and a defense attorney
still can argue that it is not. And any individual juror can decide on his or her own that the injury
is not substantial enough, causing a hung jury or acquittal. There is no need for such looseness
in the joints.165 Wisconsin’s statute fixes this problem.
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Compare Wis. Stat. § 939.22 (4), (14) (2012) with Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subds. 7, 8 (2012). One particular case
illustrates that the bar for “bodily harm” presumably as low as Minnesota’s. In State v. Higgs, the defendant threw
urine in the victim’s eyes, causing a burning and stinging sensation. 601 N.W.2d 653, 660 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
The court determined that the victim’s description of the sensation she felt was “pain” and thus “bodily harm.” Id.
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Wis. Stat. § 939.22 (38). It is noteworthy that the legislature specifically includes two disfiguring injuries not
previously discussed in this article: burns and petechia. The addition of petechial hemorrhaging occurred only
within the past decade. See 2007 WI Act 127, § 3 (effective April 4, 2008) (amending the statutory definition of
“substantial bodily harm” in Wis. Sat. § 939.22 (38) to include a petechia).
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Anecdotally, in a Hennepin County District Court trial in the summer of 2012, a skilled and experienced
colleague of mine tried an Assault-in-the-Third-Degree case in which the victim was whacked in the forehead with a
skateboard and suffered a laceration which required several stitches to repair. In closing argument, and for the first
time in the proceeding, defense counsel argued that the laceration was not “substantial disfigurement.” In rebuttal,
the prosecutor was left with little response beyond visually displaying displeasure at defense counsel’s challenge to
a belief that virtually all criminal-law practitioners in Minnesota ascribe. In terms of what was said to the jury,
however, she was left to say only “Yes, it is!” and run through the definition of substantial bodily harm. There were
no other pertinent elements of the offense at issue. After deliberation, the jury found the defendant not guilty.
Obviously, despite the tea leaves left by the unpublished laceration cases cited above, there is nothing in statute or
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Other benefits to Wisconsin’s definition of substantial bodily harm are apparent. Instead of
requiring a jury to figure out what “loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ” means, the Wisconsin legislature specifies what the areas of concern are: loss of
consciousness, sight, and hearing. Additionally, by specifically listing “concussion” as a form of
substantial bodily harm, one may assume the legislature is referring to impairment of brain
function, which is how concussions typically are defined and described.166 The Wisconsin
statute demystifies “substantial bodily harm” and makes the mathematics obvious and clinical, as
it should be.
Another benefit is that, instead of using the term “fracture of any bodily member,” the Wisconsin
legislature uses several terms to clarify what it deems substantial injury: (1) fracture of a bone;
(2) broken nose; (3) loss or fracture of a tooth. Bone fractures and broken noses are considered
substantial bodily harm in Minnesota, but Wisconsin clears up the issue of teeth. The statute
clarifies that Wisconsin refuses to distinguish between a fracture of a tooth and fracture of a
bone, and it specifies that a loss of a tooth should not be considered great bodily harm. So, on
the issue of tooth loss, Wisconsin diverges from Minnesota, perhaps appropriately, by treating
the injury less seriously. But the statute brings clarity, and it avoids the legal-issue/fact-issue
problem identified in the Moore decision previously discussed. Jurors in Wisconsin are not left
having to play “connect-the-dots,” as they are in Minnesota.
5B: Wisconsin’s “Great Bodily Harm”
Wisconsin has not modified its definition of “great bodily harm” to list specific injuries; it retains
the same language embraced by the MPC over fifty years ago. Indeed, given the age of the
statute, it should be no surprise that the hand-wringing over the concept of “great bodily harm”
has taken place a few times since Wisconsin implemented its modern assault-statute regime in
the 1950s.167 Just like in Minnesota, the issue of what constitutes great bodily harm typically
arises in Wisconsin on sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, and, just like in Minnesota, the
Wisconsin courts have struggled finding the demarcation line.168 The Wisconsin court of appeals
case law to help determine that an injury indeed should be considered substantial bodily harm or not. The jurors
were left to work through what should be deemed “substantial” for themselves, which seems oddly subjective and
arbitrary. Inviting a jury to evaluate credibility is one thing, and jurors do a marvelous job at it. But, why should
they be asked to determine whether a laceration that requires stitches to repair should be ascribed the adjective
“substantial?” Presumably, all parties, including the defendant, the court, defense counsel, the jury, and the
prosecutor, would have preferred to see the issue resolved earlier in the process, most obviously via clearer,
additional legislative guidance.
166
See State v. McKague, 159 Wash. App. 489, 501-505, 246 P.3d 558, 563-566 (Wash. Div. 2. 2011) (discussing
concussions and holding that a concussion on its own, absent loss of consciousness, rose to the level of substantial
bodily harm under Washington law).
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See State v. Bronston, 7 Wis.2d 627, 631-32, 97 N.W.2d 504, 507 (Wis. 1959), rehearing denied (Wis. Oct. 6,
1959) (discussing changes in the aggravated battery statute, Wis. Stat. § 849.22).
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See, e.g., State v. Bronston, 7 Wis.2d 627, 629-30, 97 N.W.2d 504, 506-07 (Wis. 1959), rehearing denied (Wis.
Oct. 6, 1959). Here, the court was asked to review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an aggravated-battery
(equivalent to First Degree Assault) conviction involving a victim who was struck on the head by the defendant with
a wrench, causing a two-inch scalp laceration, causing her to be hospitalized for a few hours, and causing her
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explicitly conceded that point in 1999, when it stated “it is not easy as a matter of law to draw
the line of demarcation between ‘great bodily harm’ and other levels of bodily harm.” 169 The
court acknowledged that, given the current statutory definition of “great bodily harm,” the issue
of whether an injury constitutes great bodily harm must “fall into the twilight zone” of jury factfinding and deliberation.170 In other words, the court acknowledged that, as part of the judicial
branch, it can only interpret the words of the statute; it cannot complete the purportedly
mysterious fact-finding chore with which lay jurors are tasked.171
There is little value in running through more case law from Wisconsin to illustrate that its
appellate courts have struggled with placing certain injuries on either side of the “great bodily
harm” dividing line. They appear to have had the same problems with interpretation and
inconsistency that Minnesota has had and should now try to avoid.
Fortunately, the examination of Wisconsin’s assault-statute regime points to a proposal on how
to improve the situation in Minnesota.
Part 6: Proposal
The discussion in Part 4 of this article supports the notion that, in Minnesota, there is a lack of
clarity in the definitions of substantial bodily harm and great bodily harm. Given the lack of
clarity, there is too great of a potential for confusion, arbitrary interpretation, unequal treatment
of similarly-situated defendants, and for injustice. The discussion in Part 5 of the Wisconsin
statutory regime points to a way to reduce the potential for confusion.
This article presents a simple proposal: In short, the Minnesota legislature should adopt either
the explicit language used in Wisconsin’s definition of “substantial bodily harm” or at least
follow its approach in identifying the specific injuries that should be covered under the term.
Doing so would clear up many of the confusions discussed in Part 4, and it would allow
prosecutors to make easier and more consistent charging decisions. Certainly, this change is not
intended to benefit just prosecutors. Doing so may save a defendant from even being charged
with a felony offense. It also would save jurors from having to make the difficult evaluations of
injuries in their deliberation rooms, which indeed should be less mysterious places than The
Twilight Zone. Thus, there are multiple reasons why modifying the statute would be just and
serve multiple beneficiaries.

headaches and pain in the jaw for some time after the assault. Reviewing the testimony, the court observed that the
victim testified that she no longer had pain. The court acknowledged that its state’s new statute “is not concerned
with the potentialities of the offender’s act but only with its end result.” It swiftly noted that, because the victim no
longer felt pain, she did not suffer “permanent or protected loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member
or organ.” Thus, the victim did not suffer great bodily harm.
169
State v. Rodriguez, 323 Wis.2d 821, 781 N.W.2d 550, 2010 WL 94032, *3 (Wis. App. Jan 12, 2010)
(unpublished).
170
Id. (quoting State v. Flores, 76 Wis.2d 50, 59, 250 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Wis. 1977)) (emphasis added).
171
See id. at *2-*4.
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The Minnesota legislature also should follow this approach in adopting a new definition of “great
bodily harm.” It is evident that this has not been done in Wisconsin to date, but the Minnesota
legislature should not conclude that it would be impossible to craft a definition of great bodily
harm that provided more clarity to practitioners. Indeed, even if the legislature broke down the
definition in the form of a simpler list, the potential for confusion could be minimized. The list
could begin with fairly non-controversial types of bodily injuries, including injuries which:
1. Create a high probability of death
2. Cause the permanent loss of any bodily member or organ.
3. Cause the permanent or protracted loss of the function of any bodily member of
organ.
These are three categories which are fairly straightforward and which, according to the review of
appellate decisions above, appear to have involved far fewer confusions and controversies.
The legislature would then need to determine how to clarify the concept of “serious permanent
disfigurement.” This article proposes the following language:
4. Prominent scarring or other permanent disfigurement of the skin.
The new term used in the proposed language, of course, is “prominent,” which was selected
because the Minnesota appellate courts have used the concept in this context in the past. The
word “prominence” has a number of definitions, but it typically refers to items which stand out,
which are easily seen, which are conspicuous, which are particularly noticeable, etc.172 Looking
at the cases cited in Part 3, it is clear that what the legislature is concerned about is disfigurement
which tends to (1) cause victims to change their behavior to avoid exposure to others and/or (2)
make victims feel considerable embarrassment or shame when their disfigurement is visible to
others. The concept of “prominence” addresses both of these concerns. This language could
assist prosecutors, jurors, and appellate courts in determining what types of scars should be
counted as “great bodily harm.” While this category still does not involve a cut-and-dry, explicit
description of specific qualifying injuries, it is a more workable definition to apply to disparate
factual scenarios involving scars.
Lastly, the Minnesota legislature should find a way to modify the catch-all category of “other
serious bodily harm.” This article proposes the following replacement:
5. Two separate and distinct injuries, each of which constitutes substantial bodily harm,
arising from the same course of conduct.
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See Dictionary.com, "prominent," in Dictionary.com Unabridged. Source location: Random House, Inc.
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14, 2012.
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As the reader may recall, the review of the case law suggests that the category of “other serious
bodily harm” is treated mainly as a repository for complex multi-injury assaults. There does not
appear to be any specific case in which an individual injury was not covered by the other
categories of great bodily harm but was deemed to fit exclusively in the category of “other
serious bodily harm.” In the cases which discussed “other serious bodily harm,” there were
victims who had received multiple injuries, more than one of which individually constitutes
substantial bodily harm, and it seemed apparent that the amount of harm caused by the
defendants in those cases justified charging and convicting them of an offense more serious than
Assault in the Third Degree. The language chosen above would address that type of case.
The language chosen, while broad enough to cover complex assaults, is intended to provide two
limitations. First, the two injuries must be significantly different. For example, it would not
allow a prosecutor to charge First Degree Assault for an assault involving two fractured ribs
received in the same assault. In such a case, two fractured ribs would not be distinct. Second,
the two injuries would have to derive from one assaultive incident. For example, this category of
harm would not allow a prosecutor to charge First Degree Assault if, on one day, the defendant
fractured the victim’s rib and, the next day, broke his nose. Such a situation would constitute
two separate assaults. Also, it would not allow a prosecutor to charge First Degree Assault if a
defendant punched a victim once in the face, knocking him unconscious and causing a laceration
which required stitches to repair. Those two injuries, although distinct, are not separate from
each other; they were caused by a single voluntary act.173
Taking account of these five proposed categories of great bodily harm, it appears that almost all
of the injuries that currently are considered great bodily harm would remain covered. However,
the new language would be clearer, more helpful, and more objective. Surely, there would be
issues to resolve if this statutory regime would be adopted. However, the article’s intent is not to
present a complete piece of legislation or a complete defense of the proposal that has been
sketched; it is to identify a problem and to point toward a potential solution.
Part 7: Conclusion
The task of making a charging decision in a felony assault case is not one that any ethical
prosecutor takes lightly. One would hope that the charging decisions that prosecutors make
would be easy and mathematical, but charging decisions rarely are, as not every aspect of a case
is reducible to presenting an accurate map or solving a mathematical equation. Nevertheless, this
article has looked at Minnesota’s assault-statute regime and pointed to a problem which makes
charging decisions potentially more subjective and arbitrary than they should or need to be.
Specifically, the article has discussed the concepts of substantial bodily harm and great bodily
harm, which are the defining, distinguishing concepts in Minnesota’s felony assault statutes.
There is little justification for why these concepts are as unclear as they are. This article presents
173
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the hope that, with a modest amount of legislative change, the charging of felony assaults can
become a little bit more mathematical.
Ideally, evaluating whether an injury in a new case is tantamount to substantial bodily harm or
great bodily harm would require only some sort of “box-checking.” Instead, as this article
reveals, the current definitions of these terms complicate and often prevent simple categorization
of an injury. This article has presented reasons and examples intended to compel the reader to
believe that the Minnesota legislature should improve and clarify the definitions of substantial
bodily harm and great bodily harm.
The article has proposed modifying Minnesota’s definition of substantial bodily harm by
adopting Wisconsin’s definition because Wisconsin clearly specifies a list of injuries. Adopting
Wisconsin’s definition would be helpful to all practitioners, jurors, and defendants, and it would
make the criminal-justice system more just. This change also would continue to build on the
element-analysis philosophy and goals of the MPC.
The article has proposed modifying Minnesota’s definition of great bodily harm by trying to
make a clearer and more explicit list of the types of injuries which should be included. The exact
proposal in the article does not present a radical change to the current regime, except that it
attempts to provide a clearer definition of the type of permanent disfigurement that should be
considered great bodily harm. It also dispenses with the category of “other serious bodily harm”
by creating a category that can be used when victims receive multiple substantial injuries in the
same assaultive incident.
These statutory modifications should improve the ease and consistency in the charging of felony
assault cases, and they have the potential for increasing justice and fairness for defendants and
for the public. These changes are ones which hopefully all conscientious practitioners,
legislators, and citizens would support.

28

